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Day: Revisiting Masterpiece Cakeshop - Free Speech and the First Amend

REVISITING MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP-FREE
SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CAN
POLITICAL CORRECTNESS BE COMPELLED?
Terri R. Day*
The First Amendment is being attacked from the "left" and the
"right." In previous articles, I have explored an erosion of the
interchange of diverse ideas on college campuses due to the political
correctness movement'and the stifling of political discourse by a
President, who labels official criticism as fake news.2 This Article
continues to explore the political correctness movement and its
dampening effect on the marketplace of ideas. This Article will discuss a
movementthis
by
spawned
concept
twenty-first-century
microaggression. The concept of microaggression has had a
"boomerang" effect on speech. 3 Originally, political correctness was an
attempt to enhance the marketplace of ideas and provide a diversity of
viewpoints. Instead, it has polarizedthe left and the right, each entrenched
in its ownform of intolerance.In 2015, the Supreme Court legalized samesex marriage.'Perhaps,as a result of that decision, LGBTQ rights have
* Professor of Law, Barry University School of Law; LL.M. 1995, Yale University; J.D.
1991, University ofFlorida; M.S.S.A. 1976,Case Western Reserve University; BA. 1974, University
of Wisconsin, Madison. The Author owes a debt of gratitude to Andraya Jackson, who contributed
substantially to this Article, and to Dean Diaz for her support of my scholarship.

1.
(2018).

See generally Terri R. Day& Danielle Weatherby, Speech Narcissism,70 FLA. L. REV. 839

2. See generally Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, Shackled Speech: How President
Trump's Treatment of the Press and the Citizen-CriticUndermines the Central Meaning of the First
Amendment, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 311 (2019); President Donald Trump, Remarks at the
Conservative Political Action Conference in Oxon Hill, Maryland (Feb. 27, 2017) (transcript
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefmgs-statements/remarks-president-trumpat
available
conservative-political-action-conference) ("I want you all to know that we are fighting the fake news.

It's fake-phony, fake..

.

.A few days ago, I called the fake news 'the enemy of the people'-and

they are. They are the enemy of the people.").
3. Boomerang effect is defined as "[a] strong counter-reaction when there is a deliberate
attempt to change an attitude (resulting in a strengthening or adoption of the attitude that the marketer
REFERENCE,
OXFORD
Boomerang Effect,
Overview:
to
change)."
attempting
was

https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095518984(lastvisitedNov.
18,2019).
4. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015).
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become a flashpointfor political correctness. The controversy of this
decision continues,pitting the "left" againstthe "right," with both groups
invoking the First Amendment. The latest clash concerns anti-LGBTQ
discrimination in public accommodations versus religious adherents'
FirstAmendment rights to refuse their services infacilitationof same-sex
marriages.' This Article will discuss an example of political correctness
from the "left" perspective-a New York City ordinance that extends the
definition of harassmentunder public accommodation discriminationto
the use of pronouns.' The Trump administration has countered this
expansion ofpolitical correctnessfrom the "left" by invokingfreedom of
conscience and religion,furtheringa "conservative" agenda to push back
on expanding LGBTQ rights and support of same-sex marriage. In a
guidancememo issued by the DepartmentofJustice, the Attorney General
instructs all executive departments and agencies "to the greatest extent
practicable and permitted by law, religious observance and practice
should be reasonablyaccommodatedin all government activity, including
employment, contracting, and programming."' This Article questions
whether religious objectors, who refuse to provide their services in
facilitatinga same-sex marriage,are discriminatingon the basis ofsexual
orientationor refusing to adopt a politically correct, albeit legal, view of
marriage. If the latter, then, compelling political correctness can have a
boomerang effect, creating more LGBTQ discrimination. Given this
administration's strong support for religious freedom and two new
conservative justices on the Supreme Court, a legislative religious
exemption in public accommodation laws may be saferfor LGBTQ rights
than risking a Supreme Court ruling constitutionally enshrining a
religiousright to discriminate.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2015, the Supreme Court legalized same-sex marriage. 8 In
response to the concern of the dissenting justices regarding the opinion's

5. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,1723 (2018).
6. See N.Y.C., N.Y., LoCAL LAW No. 85 (2005); N.Y.C., N.Y., LOCAL LAW No. 3 (2002); see
also N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN CODE § 8-130 (Supp. 2018).
7. Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Att'y Gen., to all Executive Departments and Agencies
on Federal Law Protections for Religious Liberty 1 (Oct. 6, 2017) (accessible at
https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-releaselfile/1001891/download) [hereinafter Memorandum from
Jeff Sessions].
8. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2607-08.
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effect on religious liberty,' Justice Kennedy provided a caveat in his
majority opinion, stating:
[I]t must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious
doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction
that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned. The
First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are
given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so
fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep
aspirations to continue the family structure they have long revered. The
same is true of those who oppose same-sex marriage for other reasons.1 0
As states began to legalize same-sex marriages, post-Obergefell, and
perhaps to "test" Justice Kennedy's caveat, several cases have wound
their way through state and federal courts challenging application of state
public accommodation laws to persons and businesses that refuse to
provide services for same-sex marriages based on religious liberty or free
speech rights." The most notable case is Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
Colorado Civil Rights Commission.1 2 Jack Phillips, owner of Masterpiece
Cakeshop, refused to provide a same-sex couple a custom-made cake for
their wedding reception." The couple filed a complaint with the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission, alleging that they were denied services in a
place of public accommodation in violation of the Colorado AntiDiscrimination Act ("CADA"), which prohibits discrimination based on
sexual orientation.14 After the Civil Rights Commission and the Colorado
courts ruled against Mr. Phillips's First Amendment claims, Mr. Phillips

9. Id. at 2625 (Roberts, CJ., dissenting) (opining that the Court's decision "creates serious
questions about religious liberty"); id. at 2642-43 (Alito, J., dissenting) (forecasting that those who
continue to oppose same sex marriage based on their rights of conscience will be "labeled as
bigots .. .by governments, employers, and schools," if they express their views in public).
10. Id. at 2607.
11. See, e.g., Elane Photography, LLC v. Willcock, 309 P.3d 53, 58-61 (N.M. 2013), cert.
denied572 U.S. 1046 (2014) (denying petition for writ of certiorari to address whether taking wedding
pictures constitutes expressive conduct protected under the First Amendment Free Speech Clause);
Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051,1056, 1058-59 (Or. App. 2017), vacated and
remanded by 139 S. Ct. 2713 (2019) (seeking review on Free Speech and Free Exercise claims of
bakery owners fined under Oregon's public accommodation law for refusal to make a custom-made
wedding cake for a same-sex ceremony); Washington v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 54951 (Wash. 2017), vacated and remanded by 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (seeking review on Free Speech
and Free Exercise claims of a florist fined under Washington's public accommodation laws for refusal
to create custom-made floral arrangements for a same-sex ceremony).
12. 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
13. Id. at 1723-24.
14. Id. at 1723, 1725.
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petitioned the Supreme Court." There, he raised both a Free Speech and
a Free Exercise claim. 1 6
Mr. Phillips claimed that requiring him to bake a custom-made
wedding cake violated his First Amendment Free Speech rights by
"compelling him to exercise his artistic talents to express a message with
which he disagreed." 1 7 Further, Mr. Phillips expressed his sincerely held
religious beliefs that same-sex marriages are wrong; therefore, requiring
him to custom-make a wedding cake for same-sex weddings violated his
Free Exercise rights. 1 8 The Supreme Court did not decide the Free Speech
claim; instead, the Court ruled in favor of Mr. Phillips based on the
specific facts of his case. 19 The Court noted that the holding in Mr.
Phillips's case would not influence "the outcome of some future
controversy involving facts similar to these."2 0
In the public hearings before the Civil Rights Commission to
adjudicate the claim that Mr. Phillips violated CADA, commissioners
were hostile towards Mr. Phillips's religious beliefs condemning samesex marriage. 2 1 One of the Commissioners said the following:
I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the last
meeting. Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all
kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery,
whether it be the holocaust, whether it be-I mean, we-we can list
hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has been used to justify
discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces of
rhetoric that people can use to-to use their religion to hurt others.22
Based on the hostility the commissioners showed toward
Mr. Phillips's religious beliefs, the Court concluded that "these statements
cast doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the Commission's
adjudication of Phillips's case." 23
This case does not foreshadow how the Court would decide future
cases when public accommodation laws, prohibiting discrimination based
on sexual orientation, clash with religious beliefs against same-sex
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1726-27.
1727.
1726.
1725-26.
1724 (finding that the Colorado Civil Rights Commission reacted to Mr. Phillips's

religious objections with hostility; therefore, the Commission failed to maintain the neutrality toward
religion which the Free Exercise Clause requires).

20. Id.
21.

Id. at 1729 ("One commissioner suggested that Phillips can believe 'what he wants to

believe,' but cannot act on his religious beliefs and 'if he decides to,' he cannot do 'business in the
state."').
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1730.
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marriage. However, Justice Alito predicted, in his Obergefell dissent, that
those who continue to oppose same-sex marriage based on their rights of
conscience will be "labeled as bigots."24 Judging from the Colorado
Commissioners' statements, Justice Alito's prediction proved true in Mr.
Phillips's case.2 5
While Obergefell secured the right to marry for same-sex couples,
the Court declined to expand anti-discrimination protection to members
of the LGBTQ community under equal protection analysis.26 Fortunately,
many state and local governments have provided such protection in their
public accommodation laws, making it unlawful for businesses to
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. 2 Having lost the fight over
same-sex marriage, these local and state public accommodation laws have
become the next frontier of the battle for conservatives.2 Mr. Phillips is
one of many small business owners, who have taken up arms in this battle
between LGBTQ anti-discrimination protection and freedom of
conscience. 2 9As in all legal battles, one side wins and the other loses"to the victor belong the spoils""-meaning a win on the merits of Mr.
Phillips's claims could lead to a slippery slope with no brakes!
Fortunately, the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision was limited to the
facts of that case and was not a "winner-take-all" result. But, given
President Trump's newly-appointed Supreme Court justices and his
policies broadening "conscience protections," as promised to his religious

24. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 264243 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting).
25. See Mark L. Movsesian, Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Future of Religious Freedom, 42
HARv. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y. 711, 713, 719 (2019) (theorizing that Masterpiece Cakeshop reveals two
cultural trends: (1) religious polarization and (2) an expanding concept of equality).
26. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
27. State and local public accommodation laws vary. Some provide more coverage (adding, for
example, gender identity and transgender to the list of protected classes) and apply to employers and
landlords. See, e.g., H.R. 2661, 59th Leg. 2006 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006) (expanding public
accommodation laws to include sexual orientation); Larissa Hamblin, Florida Now Has an LGBTQ
Consumer Advocate for the First Time Ever, CLICK ORLANDO (Mar. 21, 2019, 4:51 PM),
https://www.clickorlando.com/news/nik-harris-appointed-as-first-lgbtq-consumer-advocate
(discussing how the current commissioner of the Florida Department of Agriculture has expanded
protections in the Department to include the LGBTQ community and is "lead[ing] the south").
28. See Adam K. Hersh, Daniel in the Lion's Den: A Structural Reconsideration of Religious
Exemptions From NondiscriminationLaws Since Obergefell, 70 STAN. L. REv. 265, 286 (2018).
29. See, e.g., Elane Photography v. Willcock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013) (alleging that a
photography company refused to offer its photographic services to customer because of her sexual
orientation).

30. The term is linked to Senator William L. Marcy, referring to the victory of Andrew Jackson
in 1828, meaning that the winner of a conflict gains additional benefits, beyond the subject of the
conflict. William L. Marcy, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/

biography/William-L-Marcy (last visited Nov. 18, 2019).
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conservative and evangelical base, the forecast for the next Masterpiece
Cakeshop-like case does not look bright for the LGBTQ community.3 1
A better solution would be for those jurisdictions that have extended
anti-LGBTQ discrimination in their public accommodation laws to create
a small legislative religious exemption. The narrow exemption would
apply to sole proprietors, like Mr. Phillips, who believe that using their
services to facilitate a same-sex marriage is wrong according to their
sincerely held religious beliefs. In this post-Obergefell, anti-political
correctness era, the proposed compromise is based on the acceptance of
two basic assumptions: (1) Obergefell left a door open for religious
adherents to continue in belief and perhaps actions deemed expressive
conduct to oppose same-sex marriage3 2 and (2) compelling small business
owners with sincerely held religious beliefs to provide services for samesex marriages is, in essence, forcing a politically correct view of marriage.
Part II of this Article will summarize the central meaning of the First
Amendment discussed in a previous article. 3 3 Part I will describe the
history and meaning of the political correctness movement. 34 Part IV will
discuss microaggression, a concept born out of the political correctness
movement. 3 5 In exploring the question of compelling political correctness,
Part V will discuss the likely difficulties in litigating microaggressionrelated claims.36The New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"),
an existing example of compelled political correctness, will be discussed
in Part VI.3 The NYCHRL includes proper gender usage under the
umbrella of public accommodation gender discrimination.3 Part VII
revisits the Masterpiece Cakeshop conflict between anti-discrimination
protection for same-sex marriage rights and religious beliefs, suggesting
a legislative compromise. 39 In conclusion, Part Vm will make the case
for compromise.4 0

31. Ariana Eunjung Cha et al., Trump Touts New Faith-BasedProtectionsfor Health-Care
Workers at National Day of Prayer Ceremony, WASH. POST (May 2, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/religion/2019/05/02/trump-touts-new-faith-based-protectionshealth-care-workers-national-day-prayer-ceremony.
32. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
33. See generally Day & Weatherby, supra note 2 (discussing the First Amendment and its
central meaning); see infra Part II.
34. See infra Part IL.
35. See infra Part IV.
36. See infra Part V.
37. See infra Part VI.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 164-72.
39. See infra Part VII.
40. See infra Part VIII.
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THE CENTRAL MEANING OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein."4 1 For three-quarters of a
century, Supreme Court Justices have quoted Justice Jackson's eloquent
words in their opinions as they gave meaning to the First Amendment. 4 2
The relevant text of the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." 4 3 For over a century,
the First Amendment Speech Clause has been the quintessential American
hallmark of a self-governing people." But, in modem times, freedom of
speech has been challenged, and oftentimes restricted, in places
traditionally open to robust intellectual discourse, such as
college campuses.45
In the early 1900s, Justices Holmes and Brandeis first breathed life
into the Free Speech Clause as they articulated the core principles of the
First Amendment in a line of seminal cases, namely-Abrams v. United
States 6 and Whitney v. California.4 7 In Abrams, the Court upheld the
conviction of defendants for distributing pro-Russia political leaflets in
New York City in violation of the Espionage Act.4 8 Dissenting, Justice
Holmes wrote, "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out."4 9 Justice

41. W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
42. Agency for Int'l. Dev. v. All. for Open Soc'y. Int'l., Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 220-21 (2013)
(quoting Justice Jackson in finding that the requirement that recipients of federal funding under AIDS
prevention statute oppose prostitution violated the First Amendment); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 870 (1982) (quoting Justice Jackson in the plurality opinion finding that removing certain books
from the school libraries violated the students' First Amendment rights).
43.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

44. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,269 (1964).
45. See, e.g., GREG LUKIANOFF, UNLEARNING LIBERTY: CAMPUS CENSORSHIP AND THE END
OF AMERICAN DEBATE 11 (2014) ("Political correctness has become part of the nervous system of

the modem university and it accounts for a large number of the rights violations I have seen over the
years."); Peter Wright, Problematic:The Battle for Free Speech, HARV. POL. REV. (Dec. 6, 2015),
http://harvardpolitics.com/harvard/problematic-battle-free-speech (discussing censorship of speech
and "safe-zone" on Harvard Law School's campus); Harvey C. Mansfield Jr., Frank G. Thomson
Professor of Gov't at Harvard Univ., Political Correctness and the Suicide of the Intellect (June 26,
1991) (discussing the opinion that modem "scholarship must not only be inspired by, but infused with
political correctness").
46. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
47. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
48. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616-17, 624.
49. Id. at 630.
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Holmes's concept of an open market for the exchange of ideas would
become a pillar of First Amendment jurisprudence.5 0
Even before Justice Holmes, the writings of John Milton eloquently
explained this concept of finding truth through free and open debate:
[T]hough all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth,
so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting
to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew
Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?"
The United States secured its independence from the oppression of
the English crown. The founding fathers fought the American Revolution,
in part, to secure the right for free speech and a free press, which are
essential to self-governance and representational democracy.5 2 In
Whitney, Justice Brandeis believed that it was a citizen's "political duty"
to engage in uninhibited public discussion.5 3 He recognized that the
founding fathers "valued liberty as both an end and as a means" to secure
autonomy and happiness.5 Moreover, he believed that "the greatest
5
menace to freedom is an inert people."

Together, Abrams and Whitney laid the foundation for the
marketplace of ideas and the civic duty to engage in political discourse as
essential for a self-governing people.5 6 It was several decades later that
the Court took the next step in defining the central meaning of the First
Amendment. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Justice Brennan tied
the First Amendment to "[a] profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes
50. Knox v. Serv. Emps. Intern. Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 309 (2012) ("The First
Amendment creates 'an open marketplace' in which differing ideas about political, economic, and
social issues can compete freely for public acceptance without improper government interference.");
Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc, v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 530, 534 (1980) (utilizing
Justice Holmes's test in holding the commission's suppression of bill inserts that discuss controversial
issues of public policy directly infringes the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment).
51. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING TO
THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND 69 (EBSCO Indus. 2009) (1644).

52. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (noting clear
and present danger test overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.444 (1969)).
53. Id. at 375.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. For interesting discussions of these cases, see, e.g., Michael Kahn, The Origination and
Early Development ofFreeSpeech in the United States, FLA. B J., Oct. 2002, at 74; David M. Rabban,
The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1303, 1305-06
(1983); David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE L.J. 514, 521
(1981); David A. Strauss, Persuasion,Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L.REV.
334, 336-39 (1991).
57. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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unpleasantly sharp attacks."" The Court recognized that in the exchange
of ideas, some ideas are more palatable than others, but offensive ideas
are a necessary price to pay for all ideas to "have their way" in the
market. 59 Even wrong or "erroneous statement[s] [are] inevitable in free
debate" but must be protected "if the freedoms of expression are to have
the 'breathing space' that they 'need . .. to survive."" In other words,
wrong-headed ideas must be protected to make room for better ideas.61
To hold otherwise would either chill speech or would restrict speech
based on viewpoint, both of which are intolerable under the First
Amendment. 6 2 The Court has consistently recognized that "[u]nder the
First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea."" When citizens
engage in public debate on matters of public concern,6 all opinions should
be heard; and "[h]owever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for
its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas."65
In fact, the Court has only delineated a very few, narrowly defined
categories of speech which fall outside the ambit of First Amendment
protections-"obscenity, defamation, fraud, incitement, and speech
integral to criminal conduct [including child pornography]."66 The Court
has expressly confined categorical restriction of speech to these above
stated areas, refusing to extend the categorical approach to other types
ofspeech. 67
It is a long-standing assumption, supporting the New York Times'
broad concept of uninhibited public debate, that Americans are hardy and
58. Id. at 270.
59. Id. at 271-72.
60. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963)).
61. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1974).
62. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 278; see also Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the ChillingEffect,
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1650 (2013).
63. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339.
64. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 447, 452-53 (2011) (discussing the tort liability
of Westboro Baptist Church members for picketing near a soldier's service); see also Jason Paul
Saccuzzo, Note, Bankrupting the FirstAmendment: Using Tort Litigation to Silence Hate Groups, 37
CAL. WESTERN L. REv. 395, 414-15 (2001) (arguing that tort liability is being utilized to repress
unpopular speech).
65. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340-41.
66. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 460 (2010) (holding unconstitutional a statute
criminalizing selling depictions of animal cruelty); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973)
(establishing the legal test for defining obscenity); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481, 485
(1957) (finding obscenity not constitutionally protected speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (finding fighting words have "such slight social value" so as to fall outside
First Amendment protection).
67. See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709,717 (2012) (rejecting a "free-floating test for
First Amendment coverage ... [based on] ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits" for
violations of the Stolen Valor Act).
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can tolerate caustic speech. 68 The political correctness movement rejects
this assumption, assuming instead that individuals need protection from
offensive speech.
III.

POLITICAL CORRECTNESS

Today, the term "political correctness" is invoked in a negative
light. 69 In the twenty-first century, the term has a partisan meaning-that
is, the phrase is detested by the right but required by the left. 70 The term
did not always carry a negative connotation. The phrase had generally
been a compliment and showed a belief of inclusivity of ideas and
persons71 The shift came in the 1990s when the term became "laced with
partisan feeling." 7 2 Now, the term is defined as "conforming to a belief
that language and practices which could offend political sensibilities (as
in matters of sex or race) should be eliminated."7 3
This conception of what it means to be "politically correct" makes
apparent that the term generally applies to the expression of particular

68. See generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 397, 414 (1989) (noting, in holding
unconstitutional a statute making it a criminal offense to burn a flag as a form of protest, that "[i]f
there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not

prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable"); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1964) (discussing that public
officials cannot be shielded from criticism out of concern for their dignity and reputation and

expecting public officials to be able to tolerate harsh criticism); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252,
270-71 (1941) (noting that contempt powers cannot be used to protect the dignity and reputation of
judges-the "character of American public opinion" would not tolerate "enforced silence" to protect
the dignity and reputation ofjudges).
69. In a poll conducted by Fairleigh Dickinson University, sixty-eight percent of those polled
agreed that "a big problem this country has is being politically correct." Trump Taints America's
Views on PoliticalCorrectness, FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIV., https://view2.fdu.edu/publicmind/20

15/151030 (last visited Nov. 18, 2019); see also Eugene Robinson, RepublicansAre the Ones Hiding
Behind 'PoliticalCorrectness', WASH.POST (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/republicans-are-the-ones-hiding-behind-political-correctness/2015/11/23/ec3bda34-

921d-11e5-a2d6f57908580b1f_story.html?utmterm=.8ee7laaf5e8c

("The Republican presidential

candidates and the far-right echo chamber have made 'politically correct' an all-purpose dismissal for
facts and opinions they don't want to hear.").
70. Joshua Florence,A Phrasein Flux: The History of PoliticalCorrectness,HARV.POL.REV.
(Oct. 30, 2015), http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/phrase-flux-history-political-correctness; see
also Hannah Fingerhut, In 'PoliticalCorrectness'Debate, Most Americans Think Too Many People
Are Easily Offended, PEW RES. CTR. (July 20, 2016), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/07/20/in-political-correctness-debate-most-americans-think-too-many-people-are-easilyoffended (detailing a poll revealing that seventy-eight percent of Republicans felt people were too
easily offended and sixty-one percent of Democrats felt people need to be more careful with their
language use).
71. See Florence, supra note 70.

72. Id.
73.

Politically Correct, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (2019), https://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/politically%20correct (last updated Sept. 17, 2019).
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words. Thus, from a definitional standpoint, First Amendment principles
are implicated when political correctness is followed. 74
The driving force behind being politically correct is based on the best
of intentions-that is to shed light on and address continuing racial or
social stigma of traditionally targeted groups such as people of color,
women, those who are gender non-binary, or who fall on the LGBTQ
spectrum. 7 Topics that often demand political correctness are most
frequently matters of public concern that touch on beliefs or social
acceptance of these various groups of people. The social interest in
equality, while weighty, must be balanced against robust political
discourse among citizens of various opinions, which the First Amendment
fosters. And while those who demand political correctness do so for noble
reasons, the restriction of scathing, offensive, or hateful speech simply
cannot be regulated without censoring other ideas as well. 76
Political correctness invocations frequently come from speech that
some view as offensive and contrary to what society should be willing to
accept. 7 7Yet the Supreme Court has expressly found that offensive speech
may not be stifled under the First Amendment. 78 But rather, "[t]he
constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as
diverse and populous as ours."79 The Court differentiated simple offensive
speech from other words that could incite violence by their utterance.s0
The Supreme Court has long recognized that offensive remarks are
"necessary side effects of the broader enduring values which [presuppose]
the process of open debate."" Moreover, a core function of freedom of
speech under a democratic form of government "is to invite dispute."82

74.

See Joseph Russomanno,

"Falsehood and Fallacies": Brandeis, Free Speech and

Trumpism, 22 COMM.L. & POL'Y 155,163-65 (2017).
75. See, e.g., James B. Clark II, PoliticalCorrectnessand the FirstAmendment: An Untenable
Conflict, NAT'L B. ASS'N MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 12.
76. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY &HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 7-8,70-

71, 111-12 (Yale University Press 1st ed. 2017) (defending uninhibited free speech on college
campuses); Craig B. Anderson, Political Correctnesson College Campuses: Freedom ofSpeech v.

Doing the Politically Correct Thing, 46 SMU L. REv. 171, 198, 209, 221 (1992); Heidi Kitrosser,
FreeSpeech, Higher Education, and the PC Narrative, 101 MINN.L.REv. 1987,2010,2025 (2017);
Frank D. LoMonte, "The Key Word Is Student": Hazelwood Censorship Crashes the Ivy-Covered

Gates, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 305, 318, 330, 354 (2013).
77.

Florence, supra note 70.

78. Cohen v. Califomia,403 U.S. 15,26 (1971); see also Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
375-77 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

79. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24.
80. Id. at 20; see, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,571-72 (1942) (discussing
limited categories of speech that may be prohibited and punished without offending the Constitution).
81. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25.
82. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
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As such, the modem concept of political correctness seems ingrained
in values that conflict with First Amendment principles. "[W]hen
offensiveness becomes the litmus test for what constitutes appropriate
speech, a robust dialogue and a vigorous exchange of ideas become
meaningless concepts." 83 To protect Justice Holmes's free market of ideas
and Justice Brandeis's citizen-critic public duty, compelled political
correctness and robust First Amendment speech rights cannot co-exist.
Further, the implication of government proscribing what ideas
should be orthodox or accepted in public discourse is forbidden under our
Constitution, 8 4 but this is exactly what political correctness demandsthat certain ideas and beliefs should give way to more mainstream ideas
or beliefs. Many times, political correctness demands are made to those
who spew hate speech, racial epithets, sexist, homophobic, or transphobic
rhetoric. And the demand that comes for silence, or at least a change in
speech, from these individuals or groups is absolute." While these types
of inflammatory statements are hateful and, indeed, hurtful to manyespecially those groups of people traditionally discriminated againstwhen a state actor is promoting political correctness, it must be viewed in
light of the First Amendment. 86 Considering the central meaning of the
First Amendment, even divisive or hateful speech must be tolerated. To
do otherwise-to prescribe what speech is favorable and tolerableconjures Orwellian warnings when government transforms into a Ministry
of Truth 8 7 While the fight to exclude racist or discriminatory speech is a
virtuous one and should be wholly pursued by society, courts are not the
proper venue to achieve this goal.
Allowing the suppression of unpopular opinions based on political
correctness permits the listener to exercise a "heckler's veto" over the
speaker, which is contrary to principles of free and open public
discourse." Consider the following as an example of political correctness
83.

Day & Weatherby, supra note 1, at 848.

84.

Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 325 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The state may not

&

ordain preferred viewpoints.. .. The Constitution forbids the state to declare one perspective right
and silence opponents.").
85. See Caroline Simon, Free Speech Isn't Free: It's Costing College Campuses Millions,
FORBES (Nov. 20, 2017, 4:35 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/carolinesimon/2017/11/20/freespeech-isnt-free-its-costing-college-campuses-millions/#6794e8491ee7; see also CHEMERINSKY
GILLMAN, supra note 76, at 70-71.
86. Note there are often other remedies for discrimination based on race, sex, or sexual
orientation via statutory avenues such as Title VII (employment discrimination) and Title IX

(education discrimination) actions. 20 U.S.C.

§§

1712-13 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16b(b) (2012).

87. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 723 (2012). See generally GEORGE ORWELL,
NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOuR (Centennial ed. 2003) (1949).
88. Anne Neal, Colleges Are Paralyzed by the 'Heckler's Veto', N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/05/19/restraint-of-expression-on-college-campuses/
colleges-are-paralyzed-by-the-hecklers-veto; see also Charles S. Nary, The New Heckler's Veto:
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providing a heckler's veto to the offended listener. While walking to class,
a liberal student, who is anti-Trump, encounters a group of pro-Trump
supporters who are handing out "Trump 2020" pamphlets and chanting
"MAGA" and "Build the Wall" outside of the university's student union.
The student immediately complains to the university administration that
she felt unsafe and uncomfortable being on campus because of the group.
In response, school officials prohibit the dissemination of all political
pamphlets, except in very limited, specifically defined, free-speech
designated areas (often in areas far away from the heavily-trafficked
campus quad)."

'

This type of encounter encapsulates the effect of the heckler's veto;
it allows an individual to suppress speech that is subjectively offensive.
Generally, the harm of a heckler's veto is application of a subjective
standard for determining what and when speech is appropriate or not. 90 As
such, sanctioning a heckler's veto undermines First Amendment
principles and chills speech. 9
In a different context, some critics say the political correctness
movement has invaded the legal field.9 2 In 2016, the American Bar
Association ("ABA") enacted Rule 8.4(g), which provides that it is
professional misconduct for an attorney to "engage in conduct that the
lawyer knows or reasonably should know . .. is discrimination on the

basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age,
sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status, or socioeconomic status
in conduct related to the practice of law."9 One critic has described this
rule as a "politically correct overlay" that does little more than give
aggressive attorneys ammo for challenging "opponents who deviate from
politically correct thought and action." 9 4 The argument follows that even
though the rule is intended to curb discriminatory conduct that generally
Shouting Down Speech on University Campuses, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 305, 307-08 (2018)
(discussing the origination of the heckler's veto and comparing it to the new heckler's veto where the
fear is the "speech itself").
89. See generally Max Kutner, Emory Students Explain Why "Trump 2016" Chalk Messages
Triggered Protest, NEWSWEEK (March 25, 2016, 8:22 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/emory-

trump-chalk-protests-440618. The hypothetical is based on this actual incident.
90. Day & Weatherby, supra note 1, at 843.
91. One scholar labeled the 2016-17 year as the year of the "shout-down," documenting
instances where presenters were shouted down from the stage and unable to speak. Nary, supra note
88, at 306, 312-14; Stanley Kurtz, Year of the Shout-Down: It Was Worse than You Think, NAT'L
REV. (May 31, 2017, 1:48 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/blog/cornerlyear-shout-downworse-you-think-campus-free-speech.
92. George Leef, Political Correctness Continues to Beat Up on Free Speech, FORBES (Sept.
19, 2016, 2:00 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgeleef/2016/09/19/political-correctnesscontinues-to-beat-up-on-free-speech/#215acOd44ece.
93. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (AM. BAR. Ass'N 2016).
94.

Leef, supra note 92.
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exhibits prejudice, it will nonetheless have the effect of chilling speech
within the legal profession and create a tense environment where attorneys
may fear sanctions for their speech.9 5 Other critics allege that the ABA is
endorsing "the new sexual order" and cautioning that "America's lawyers
have been warned[,] [t]he ABA is taking the gloves off, looking for a
knockout blow in round one of its plan to purify the legal profession. 6
Just as college campuses import political correctness into their
conduct codes, which stifles speech, now the legal profession is
attempting to import political correctness into its ethical rules, threatening
suppression of speech. While the ABA rules are not binding on attorneys,
states often adopt ethical rules that mirror the ABA rules.97 As such, if
states promulgate a rule identical to Rule 8.4(g), attorneys in those states
may be subject to professional discipline for their words or actions that do
not comport with political correctness.98
IV.

THE CONCEPT OF MICROAGGRESSION

Another topic, born from the political correctness wave, is a unique
concept of "modem racism" called "microaggression." This concept has
developed as societal standards on acceptable conduct and beliefs have
shifted. Microaggression is defined as "a comment or action that subtly
and often unconsciously or unintentionally expresses a prejudiced attitude
toward a member of a marginalized group." 99 These types of comments
"reflect less direct, although no less pernicious, forms of racial bias."too
95. Id.; see also George W. Dent, Jr., Model Rule 8.4(g): Blatantly Unconstitutional and
Blatantly Political, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICs & PUB. POL'Y 135, 167, 176, 179 (2018); Michael
S. McGinniss, Expressing Conscience with Candor: Saint Thomas More and First Freedoms in the
Legal Profession,42 HARV. JL. & PUB. POL'Y 173, 201, 203, 207-08 (2019).
96. Bill Olson & Herb Titus, The ABA Plan to Politically Purify the Legal Profession,
FEDERALIST SOC'Y

(Aug. 2,

2016),

https://fedsoc.org/commentary/blog-posts/the-aba-plan-to-

politically-purify-the-legal-profession; see also Jack Park, ABA Model Rule 8.4(g): An Exercise in
CoercingVirtue?, 22 CHAP. L.REv. 267, 272-73 ("The new rule could be applied to speech at dinners
hosted by bar associations or similar legal groups, teaching at law schools, and a lawyer's speaking
'at career day at his or her child's Catholic school about the role of faith in the practice of law.' 'The
important question is not whether a listener's reaction is "reasonable," but whether a speaker should
"reasonably" know a listener will be triggered by disrespectful speech."').
97. As of March 2019, four states adopted Rule 8.4(g) in its entirety, twenty states had already
used "some or all ideas expressed in the Model Rule comments," and six states, including Louisiana
and Texas, have expressly declined to adopt the Model Rule citing constitutional violations. See
Kristine A. Kubes, et al., The Evolution of Model Rule 8.4(g): Working to Eliminate Bias,
Discrimination, and Harassment in the Practice of Law, A.B.A. (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/construction-industry/publications/under-construction/2019/s
pring2019/model rule_8_4.
98. Leef, supra note 92.
99. Microaggression,MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
microaggression (last visited Nov. 18, 2019).
100. Scott 0. Lilienfeld, Microaggressions:Strong Claims, InadequateEvidence, 12 PERSP.ON
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One of the main proponents of this concept is Dr. Derald Wing Sue, a
Professor of Psychology at Columbia University; he suggests that
microaggressions are common experiences of everyday life.10 1 Further,
they may be expressed through speech or non-speech. 10 2 Examples of
microaggressive comments include: "You speak good English"; "Gender
pay gaps are a myth"; "You're cute for a dark-skinned girl"; or "No, like
where are you FROM?" 10 3 While these comments may seem benign, Dr.
Sue suggests they have a powerful impact on the individuals to whom the
speech is directed. 104
Microaggressions can be broken down into three categories-(1)
microassaults which are "intentional discriminatory actions"; (2)
microinsults which are verbal or nonverbal communications that "subtly
convey rudeness"; and (3) microinvalidations which "subtly exclude[,]
negate[, or nullify the thoughts ... of a person of color."1 0 5 But not all
microaggressions can be easily divvied up into these neat categories.
characterized by []
Rather, microaggression is an "[o]pen concept[] ...
intrinsically fuzzy boundaries, [] an indefinitely extendable list of
indicators, and [] an unclear inner nature." 106
The problem or ultimate quandary with this concept lies in the
invisibility and loose boundaries of microaggressions. Dr. Sue suggests
"[tihe first step in eliminating [harmful] microaggressions is to make the
'invisible' visible.""o7 These efforts can be seen by popular blog-style
websites that are meant to address recurring microaggressions
experienced by people of color, women, those who are gendernonconforming, or homosexual and provide these individuals a platform
to talk about interactions perceived to be microinsults or
microinvalidations.1os But, often the subtlety of a microaggression
precludes its discussion and hides the impact on those people affected. An
PSYCHOL. SCI, 138,139 (2017).
101. Derald Wing Sue, Racial Microaggressionsin Everyday Life, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Oct. 5,
2010),https://www.psychologytoday.comlus/blog/microaggressions-in-everyday-life/201010/racial-

microaggressions-in-everyday-life.
102. Id.
103. Id.; Is the Gender Pay Gap a Myth? 3 Highlights From Payscale &#8217;s Reddit AMA,
PAYSCALE(Nov.17,2015),https://www.payscale.com/career-news/2015/11/is-the-gender-pay-gapa-myth; Microagressions, TUMBLR, https://www.microaggressions.com/post/53189941400/youre18, 2019); Microaggressions, TUMBLR,
(last visited Nov.
cute-for-a-dark-skinned-girl
https://www.microaggressions.com/post/82203830677/guy-next-to-me-on-plane-so-where-are-you

(last visited Nov. 18, 2019); Sue supra note 101.
104.

Sue, supranote 101.

105. Id.
106. Lilienfeld, supra note 100, at 143.
107.
108.

Sue, supranote 101.
See, e.g., Microaggressions, TUMBLR,http://www.microaggressions.com (last visited Nov.

18,2019).
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individual, who feels targeted by a comment perceived to be a
microaggression, may fear being labeled "oversensitive" or "too PC." 09
Dr. Sue describes these individuals as stuck in a "Catch-22"-either the
person lets the slight go or risks being labeled in a negative manner.10
Often,
"[t]he
person . . . is left
to
question
what
actually
happened .. .. [R]esult[ing] [in] confusion [and] anger. . . ."I" In other
words, the individual is confronted with a Hobson's choice' 2 -choose to
express his or her feelings or stay silent.'13
The I, Too, Am Harvard blog page reflects the impact
microaggressions can have on individuals who are members of
traditionally marginalized groups.11 The page highlights examples of
racial microaggressions targeted at African American students on Harvard
University's campus."'s Examples of microaggressive comments and
students' responses are posted to the blog site and include: "No. I will not
teach you how to twerk"; "Having an opinion does not make me an 'Angry
Black Woman"'; "Don't you wish you were white like the rest of us?";
"You're lucky to be black .. . so easy to get into college"; and "You're
dressed like you might shoot me right now-such a thug."'1 6 These
statements are illustrative of microinsults and microinvalidations and the
negative reactions they evoke from the members of the community to
whom they are directed.
Recently, several universities have encouraged students to report
microaggressions on campus and have included in student evaluations a
section to report microaggressive comments." 7 Further, universities have

109. Sue, supra note 101; see Lilienfeld, supra note 100, at 144 (deeming the term "politically
correct" to be a microaggression).
110. Sue, supra note 101.

111.

Id.

112. Hobson's Choice,MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
Hobson's%20choice (last visited Nov. 18, 2019) (defined as "an apparently free choice when there is
no real alternative.").

113.

For a discussion ofmicroaggressions in the legal field, see generally Elizabeth B. Cooper,

The Appearance of Professionalism,71 FLA. L. REv. 1 (2019).
114. 1, Too, Am Harvard, TUMBLR, https://itooamharvard.tumblr.com

2019).
115.

(last visited Nov. 18,

Seeid.

116. 1, Too, Am Harvard, TUMBLR (Mar. 1,
255448543; I, Too, Am Harvard,TUMBLR (Mar.
255396970; 1, Too, Am Harvard,TUMBLR (Mar.
255367356; 1, Too, Am Harvard,TUMBLR (Mar.
255052774; 1, Too, Am Harvard,TUMBLR (Mar.

2014) https://itooamharvard.tumblr.com/post/78
1, 2014) https://itooamharvard.tumblr.com/post/78
1, 2014) https://itooamharvard.tumblr.com/post/78
1, 2014) https://itooamharvard.tumblr.com/post/78
1, 2014) https://itooamharvard.tumblr.com/post/78

255069382.
117. See, e.g., Luke W. Vrotsos, School of Public Health Admins Flag Classesfor Review After
Students Report 'Insults', HARV. CRIMSON (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/

4/5/hsph-insults-classes-flagged.
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flagged professors' classes for review based on these evaluations."' Of
the total responses to Harvard's course evaluation questionnaire, 85
students responded "yes" when asked if they had experienced
microaggression while in class, and in 30% of classes reviewed (43 of
138), at least one student responded "yes" to hearing microaggressive
insults.119 These numbers reflect that microaggression is a growing
concern and is beginning to affect the operation of public universities.120
Like the political correctness movement generally, the concept of
microaggression has its critics.1 2 1They have been vocal about the weight
given to microaggressions.122 These apprehensions include claims that a
focus on microaggression "discourages or suppresses controversial or
unpopular speech, [] fosters a culture of political correctness, []
perpetuates a victim culture among aggrieved individuals, and []
contributes to, rather than ameliorates, racial tensions."23
V.

LITIGATING MICROAGGRESSIONS

Because microaggressive comments are exactly that-micro-no
24
court has considered a microaggression-related claim.1 As this Article
25
asks: Can political correctness be compelled?l Should or could courts
address microaggression claims?1 26 Likely claims might concern the
prohibition or regulation of microaggressions or civil remedies for harms
caused by microaggressions. Naturally, any microaggression-related
claim would require a First Amendment analysis.

118. Id.

&

119. Id.
120. In an independent student-run newspaper, one student comments on the list of
microaggressions sent out by the then-current President of UC Berkley. See Rudra Reddy, Words Are
Violent, DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Apr. 11, 2017), https://www.dailycal.org/2017/04/10words
-are-violent.
121. See, e.g., Vikram Amar, A "Comparative" Analysis of the Academic Freedom of Public
University Professors, 14 FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 293, 293, 295, 297-98 (2016) (discussing the
University of North Carolina and University of California's list ofmicroaggressions and detailing
professors' first amendment rights); Suzanne Rowe, The Elephant in the Room, 15 LEGAL COMM.
RHETORIC: JALWD 263, 268 n.22 (2018); Reddy, supranote 120 (commenting that "[i]f ideas alone
can pierce your skin, it is not the ideas that need to be softened-it is your skin that needs to become
less fragile.").
122. See Amar, supra note 121, at 297-98.
123. Lilienfeld, supranote 100, at 140.
124. See Kiani v. Huha, No. A18-0157,2018 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 873, at *10-11 (Minn.
Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2018); see also Weinberg v. William Blair & Co., No. 12-cv-09846, 2015 WL
5731637, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30 2015) (refusing to allow microaggression under Title VII for a
hostile work environment claim).
125. See supra Part VI.
126. See supra Part VI.
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Microaggressions by their very nature implicate the First
Amendment. As discussed, the most common microaggressions involve
comments that offend on the basis of race, gender, or sexual orientation.
As such, these comments are content-based and viewpoint-based and
would trigger the highest standard of judicial scrutiny.1 27
In RA.V. v. St. Paul,128 the Court analyzed the St. Paul BiasMotivated Crime Ordinance that prohibited the display of symbols or
objects likely to "arouse[] anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender . . . ."'29 Here, the petitioner,
along with a group of teenagers, taped together a cross made from broken
chair legs and set it on fire inside the yard of an African American
family.' 0 The lower court narrowly construed the ordinance as limited to
"fighting words," which are proscribed under Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,'131 and upheld the petitioner's conviction, finding that "the
ordinance is a narrowly tailored means toward accomplishing the
compelling government interest in protecting the community against biasmotivated threats to public safety and order." 32 The Supreme Court,
however, reversed and found the statute facially unconstitutional for it
"prohibit[ed] otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subject
the speech addresses."' 3 3 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stated
that only where "the nature of the content discrimination is such that there
is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot" can a
law restricting speech, based on its content, pass constitutional muster.1 34
The St. Paul Ordinance went a step further and banned a sub-class of
speech within fighting words-that is, only speech which is likely to
arouse anger, alarm, or resentment specifically on the basis ofrace.135 This
Ordinance went beyond banning just fighting words, "that do not
themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or gender" by targeting
only those fighting words that evoke negative emotions with regard to
race.136 Thus the Ordinance constituted viewpoint discrimination. Even
taking into consideration the compelling state interest in ensuring basic

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227-28 (2015).
505 U.S. 377 (1992).
Id. at 380.
Id. at 377-79.
Id. at 380-81; Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.568,572 (1942) (describing fighting

words as "those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of

the peace.").
132. RA.V., 505 U.S. at 381.
133. Id. at 381, 396.
134. Id. at 390.
135. Id. at 391.
136. Id.
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human rights to marginalized groups, the Court found the ordinance too
broad to effectuate that purpose. 1
The Court recognized that St. Paul's ordinance served the city's
interest in communicating to minority groups that race-based hate speech

"is not condoned by the majority"138 However, "majority preferences

"

'

must be expressed in some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis
of content." 139
The RA.V. framework sheds light on the dilemma of regulating
microaggressions. If a public university or employer were to prohibit
microaggressions, it is likely the prohibition would be limited to words or
conduct that is bias-motivated and targeted at traditionally discriminatedagainst groups such as people of color, women, and members of the
LGBTQ community-which are generally the areas in which
microaggressive comments are reported. 1 4 0But, just as in RA.V., this
proscription of speech would not pass strict constitutional scrutiny for it
does nothing more than censor speech based on a certain viewpoint.
Additionally, such restriction attempts to ban subjectively offensive
speech or conduct which is equally impermissible under the
First Amendment.1 4
Just as the City of St.Paul could not communicate to minority groups
that its citizens do not condone bias-motivated crime by targeting the most
pernicious hate speech, 1 4 2 a state university could not proscribe the most
egregious microaggressive comments. A category of "politically
incorrect" speech cannot be carved out from First Amendment protection.
If the courts decline to employ a strict scrutiny analysis on the basis
of content or viewpoint discrimination, intermediate scrutiny may be
applied if the microaggression is more conduct based. In United States v.
O'Brien, 4 3 the Court determined that a prohibition on burning a draft card
in opposition to the Vietnam War did not violate the First Amendment. 1
137. Id. at 395-96.
138. Id. at 392.
139. Id.; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (finding that the power
to regulate is limited and cannot do so in a way that restricts the individual to adhere to a particular
preaching or worship).
140. See generally Kevin L. Nadal, et al., The Adverse Impact of Racial Microaggressionson
College Students' Self-Esteem, 55 J. C. STUDENT DEV.461 (2014) (conducting a study suggesting that
members of a minority group are more likely to be the targets of microaggression than white students
on college campuses); Michael R. Woodford, et al., The LGBQ Microaggressionson Campus Scale:
A Scale Development and Validation Study, 62 J. HOMOSEXUALITY, 1660-61 (2015) (conducting a
study suggesting that members of the LGBQ community are more likely to be targeted by
microaggressions on college campuses than heterosexual students).
141. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15,18,26 (1971).
142. RAY., 505 U.S. at 392-93.
143. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
144. Id. at 369-72.
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Justice Warren opined that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are
combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify
incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms."145 Justice Warren
continued, stating:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.1 46
The application of the O'Brien test to microaggressions is unlikely.
Many microaggressions come in the form of words.14 7 But, even assuming
a court would apply the standard to conduct that was deemed
microaggressive, the test would likely fail. Although the O'Brien test is a
less demanding standard of judicial scrutiny than the highest standard
applied to content-based and viewpoint-based speech restrictions, it
would be difficult to establish that the governmental interest in prohibiting
microaggressive conduct is unrelated to speech. Further, defining those
fuzzy outer-boundaries of what is a microaggressive action is akin to
applying offensiveness as the standard for speech restriction.
Another possible doctrinal avenue is to analyze the effects of
microaggression according to the secondary effects test put forth in
Renton v. Playtime Theatres. 4 8 In Renton, the Court upheld a zoning
ordinance that prohibited adult theatres from being located within a
certain distance from a residential area, school, church, or park.'4 9 In
upholding the ordinance, the Court looked to the "secondary effects" the
city was trying to protect against which included preventing crime,
protecting retail trade, and protecting the "quality of urban life ."5 The
Court found these justifications satisfactory and also noted that the
ordinance was "unrelated to the suppression of speech."'"' The
"'predominate concerns' [then] were with the secondary effects of adult
theatres, and not with the content of adult films themselves."152 The Court
accepted the characterization of the Renton ordinance as content neutral,
145.
146.

Id. at 376.
Id. at 377.

147.

Sue, supra note 101.

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986).
Id. at 43.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 45, 48.
Id. at 47.
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notwithstanding compelling arguments to the contrary.1 1 The ordinance
applied only to those theatres that showed films with graphic sexual
54
content, a typical characterization of a content-based restriction.'
Nonetheless, the Court determined that the zoning ordinance did not
violate the First Amendment based on the governmental interest of
preventing certain secondary effects.'
Applying this framework to microaggressions, courts would begin
by focusing on whether or not the interest in preventing the harm or the
secondary effects caused by the microaggressive communication is
substantial, is unrelated to the suppression of speech, and whether there
56
are reasonable alternative avenues of communication 1 Unlike in Renton,
the secondary effects of microaggression are difficult to define because
they include an indefinite list of possibilities. 1 5 7 Further, Renton was
specific to zoning laws of adult theatres."' Microaggressions may happen
anywhere; so, zoning laws are a misfit for regulating microaggression.
Finally, the secondary effects doctrine has never been applied outside the
context of zoning adult entertainment establishments.159
"[M]icroaggressions necessarily lie in the eye of the beholder."'60
The justifications for limiting microaggression will vary depending on the
effect it has on people; those effects will be highly individualized and
subjective. Microaggressions vary from subtle and ambiguous to
something more concrete, such as a microassault, which further
complicates a secondary effects analysis.161 Importantly, unlike the
secondary effects in Renton, which included the objective and measurable
effects of declining property values and increasing crime-the
government interest in regulating microaggression is aimed at reducing
the speech's impact, which is totally subjective and hard to measure.162
The secondary effects must be the targets of the asserted governmental
interest and not the "emotive impact of speech on its audience" for the
"[1]isteners' reactions to speech are not the type of 'secondary effects' [the
153.

Id. at 48; Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of

Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court'sApplication,74 S. CAL.L.REV. 49,60-61 (2000).
154. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
155. Id. at 52.
156. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); see also Young v. Am. Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 78-79 (1976).
157.

See Sue, supra note 101.

158. See Rappa v. New Castle Cty., 813 F. Supp. 1074,1081 (D. Del. 1992).
159. See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 825 F.3d 149, 160-61, 163 (3d Cir. 2017)
(declining to extend secondary effects to statutes); Rappa, 813 F. Supp. at 1081 (declining to extend
secondary effects to political speech).

160.

Lilienfeld, supra note 100, at 141.

161.

Sue, supra note 101.

162.

Renton, 475 U.S. 41,47-48 (1986); see also Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
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Court] referred to in Renton."1 63 The listeners' reaction to the
microaggression cannot be the basis for regulating microaggressive words
and actions. Thus, the secondary effects doctrine is ill-suited for
application to any microaggression-related legal claim.
VI.

COMPELLED GENDER PRONOUN USAGE

A separate wave of social conscience spawned by the political
correctness movement is the formal recognition of the fluidity of gender.
In 2002, the New York City Commission on Human Rights passed the
Transgender Rights Bill ("NYCHRL") as an effort to extend
discrimination protection to transgender or gender non-binary
individuals." The Bill allows for an individual to pursue remedial
measures on the basis of a discriminatory act or gender-based
harassment.1 6 5 Recently, the New York City Council amended the
definition of "gender" to include "actual or perceived sex[,] ... gender
identity, self-image, appearance, behavior or expression . .. or other
gender-related characteristic, regardless of the sex assigned to that person
at birth."1 6 6 This amendment broadened the definition of "gender" and
"gender-identity" from the 2002 law. 1 6 7 Under the amendment, "gender"
also incorporates gender non-conforming and intersex. 6 s Further,
"[u]nder NYCHRL, gender-based harassment covers a broad range of
conduct and occurs generally when a person is treated less well on account
of their gender." 69
NYCHRL prohibitions extend to employment, housing, and public
accommodation discrimination. 17 0 The law "requires employers and
covered entities to use the name, pronouns, and title (e.g.,
Ms./Mrs./Mx.)" with which a person self-identifies . . . ."172 Also,
included under the umbrella of pronouns is the use of he/him, she/her,
163. Boos, 485 U.S. at 321.
164. N.Y.C., N.Y., LOCAL LAW NO. 85 (2005); N.Y.C., N.Y., LOCAL LAW No. 3 (2002); see
also N.Y.C.,N.Y., ADMIN CODE § 8-130 (Supp. 2018).
165. LOCAL LAWNO. 85; ADMIN CODE §8-130; N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN CODE § 8-109(a) (2018).
166. N.Y.C., N.Y., LOCAL LAW NO. 38 (2018); ADMIN. CODE § 8-102.
167. NYC Commission on Human Rights Legal Enforcement Guidance on Discriminationon the
Basis of Gender Identity or Expression: Local Law No. 3 (2002), N.Y.C.COMMISSION ON HUM.RTS.
1-2,https://wwwI.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/pdf/publications/2019.2.15%2OGender%20Guida
nce-February%202019%20FINAL.pdf (last updated Feb. 15, 2019) [hereinafter Legal Enforcement
Guidance on Discrimination).
168. Id. at 3.
169. Id. at 4.
170. Id. at 1.
171. Id. at 4 n.15 ("The gender-neutral title Mx. is pronounced 'moks' (similar to 'mex') or
'nmks' (similar to 'mix').").
172. Id.
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they/them and ze/hir.7 The Guidance on Discrimination offers some
examples of violations of NYCHRL, which include intentional misuse of
a person's title, pronoun, or name, or refusal to use a person's preferred
pronoun after being requested to do so.' 7 4 It is not a violation of NYCHRL
to ask a person's name, gender, or self-identity in good faith.1 7 5 Violations
of NYCHRL's provisions come in the form of civil penalties ranging in
the hundreds to tens of thousands of dollars.176
In 2017, the NYCHRL imposed fines against individuals on the basis
of word choice.' 7 7 In these cases, one employer placed a job listing on
Craigslist seeking a "waitress," 1 7 and the other posted a similar ad for an
"Indian" waiter or waitress.' 7 9 The employer in the first instance was fined
$500 and the other employer was fined $1000.10 The maximum fine an
employer or entity may incur is a "civil penalt[y] of up to $125,000 for
violations, and up to $250,000 for violations that are the result of willful,
wanton, or malicious conduct. There is no limit to the amount of
compensatory damages the Commission may award to a victim of
discrimination."' 8In 2017, a medical center settled out of court and paid
a transgender woman $25,000 in compensatory damages resulting from
discrimination based on her gender identity.18 2
173. Gender-neutral pronouns
(pronounced "zee" and "here").
"Ze" Pronouns,
MYPROUNOUNS.ORG, https://www.mypronouns.org/ze-hir (last visited Nov. 18, 2019). For more
information on gender pronouns, see Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender Resource Ctr., Gender
Pronouns, U. WIS. MILWAUKEE, https://uwm.edu/1gbtrc/support/gender-pronouns (last visited Nov.
18,2019).
174. Legal Enforcement Guidance on Discrimination,supra note 167 at 5.
175. Id.
176. Decisions and Order-CCHR,N.Y.C. HUM. RTS., https://www l.nyc.gov/site/cchr/enforcem
ent/decisions-and-orders.page) (last visited Nov. 18, 2019) (listing final orders issued by the
Commission's Office of the Chair for violations of NYCHRLs).
177. Decision and order at 1-2,5-6, 8-9, N.Y.C. Comm'n on Human Rights v. Rozario, No. ME-S-14-103-839-E) (2017) (accessed at https://wwwl.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/
downloads/pdf/decisions-and-orders/Aksoy,%20Signed%20DO,%20June%2021,%202017Redacted.pdf) [hereinafter Rozario Decision and Order]; Decision and Order at 6, 10, N.Y.C.
Comm'n on Human Rights v. Bombay, No. M-E-NR-14-1029500-E (2017), (accessed at
https://wwwl.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/pdf/decisions-and-orders/Shalom%20Bombay
%202,%20Signed%20DO,%20June%2021,%202017_Redacted.pdf) [hereinafter Bombay Decision
and Order].
178. See Rozario Decision and Order, supra note 177, at 1, 4.
179. See Bombay Decision and Order, supra note 177, at 1, 6.
180. See Rozario Decision and Order, supra note 177, at 9; Bombay Decision and Order, supra
note 177, at 10.
181. NYC Comm. on Human Rights, NYC Commission on Human Rights Announces Strong
Protections for City's Transgender and Gender Non-Conforming Communities in Housing,
Employment and Public Spaces, NYC.Gov (Dec. 21, 2015), https://wwwl.nyc.gov/office-of-themayor/news/961-15/nyc-commission-human-rights-strong-protections-city-s-transgender-gender.
182. NYC Comm. on Human Rights, Mount Sinai Beth Israel Medical Center Agrees to
Implement New Proceduresto Ensure Compliance with Gender Identity Protections,NYC.GOV (July
13,2017),https://wwwl.nyc.gov/site/cchr/enforcement/2018-settlements.page.
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The Commission on Human Rights also created a Gender-ID Card
to help spread awareness of the recent law changes.'8 The ID Card
explains protections based on various non-binary gender associations and
expressive representations, such as haircuts. 18 4 Further, the ID Card lists
several recognized genders or self-identities which include, but are not
limited to: drag queen, bi-gendered, trans, gender bender, agender, third
sex, gender fluid, non-binary transgender, two-spirit, gender gifted,
pangender, person of transgender experience, and genderqueer. 85
A law that mandates the use of certain pronouns in order not to offend
the listener is unequivocally a content-based regulation. NYCHRL is also
viewpoint-based by endorsing the politically correct view of gender
classifications. Compelled use of politically correct pronouns requires a
speaker to convey the message of accepting non-binary gender
classification, which may, in fact, contradict the personal beliefs of the
speaker.1 86 Government endorsement of favored speech offends the timehonored principle that "no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall
be orthodox in politics ...

or other matters of opinion . . . ."I"

If challenged, New York City must justify NYCHRL by showing
that it is necessary to serve a compelling government interest and there is
no less speech-restrictive way to achieve that interest.' The Guidance on
Gender Discrimination states the legislative intent behind the NYCHRL
from "discrimination [that]
is to protect gender non-conforming persons
89
is 'very often a matter of life and death."'l
Accepting this governmental interest as compelling, the NYCHRL
must still be tailored to serve only that narrow interest and must not sweep
so far as to include, and thus prohibit, other types of protected speech.
Because the NYCHRL is expressly designed to target a broad swathe of
conduct and speech, a court would likely find the law overbroad and,
therefore, unconstitutional.
Further, there are no doubt less speech-restrictive means to serve the
183. NYC
Comm.
on Human
Rights, Gender Identity Expression,
https://wwwl.nyc.gov/assets/cchr/downloads/pdf/publications/GenderlDCard2Ol5.pdf

NYC.GOV,
(last visited

Nov. 18,2019).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. See Tyler Sherman,All Employers Must Wash Their Speech Before Returning to Work: The
FirstAmendment & Compelled Use of Employees' Preferred Gender Pronouns, 26 WM. & MARY

BILL RTS. J. 219, 237 (2017) (discussing whether mandating employers to use the employee's
preferred gender pronoun is an unconstitutional instance of compelled speech).

187.
188.

W.Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226, 2228,2231 (2015).

189. See N.Y.C. COUNcL, REP. OF THE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DIv., COMM. ON GEN.
WELFARE, ADMIN. CODE 8-102, Int. No. 24, at 2 (2002); Legal Enforcement Guidance on
Discrimination,supra note 167 at 2.
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City's interest. Certainly, existing civill 90 or criminal penalties can be
brought against a perpetrator who targets and harms an individual for
discrimination based on the factors included in NYCHRL's antidiscrimination protections. It is a well-recognized principle of First
Amendment jurisprudence that government cannot use speech restrictions
to deter conduct, which is within the state's police power to prohibit. 191
The NYCHRL has yet to be challenged in court. However, while
lofty, some of its provisions are, in essence, codified anti-microaggression
prohibitions. As such, if challenged, those provisions are unlikely to
survive a First Amendment challenge. The penalties for violating the
NYCHRL can be substantial.1 9 2 Already, the NYC Human Rights
Commission has imposed fines against employers for violating its law
governing word usage in their employment ads.193
While eradicating societal discrimination against the LGBTQ
community and providing LGBTQ individuals the same promise to equal
rights and dignity afforded to all citizens should be a constitutional
mandate, compelling political correctness may have a boomerang effect.
To be sure, enforcing equal protection and due process rights is different
than political correctness. As this Author has previously examined, the
modem political correctness movement has caused a backlash of
unintended consequences.194 Johns Hopkins University Associate
Professor Yascha Mounk 95 summarized a recent study on political
correctness and concluded that a large majority of Americans believe that

190. Most civil tort remedies do not permit monetary damages for dignitary or emotional harm
alone. Therefore, victims of discrimination cannot sue the perpetrator in tort law, without having
suffered some physical harm in addition to their dignitary harm. Many state and local public
accommodation laws, like NYCHRL, allow civil damage awards to victims of discrimination, often

very substantial awards. 8 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE

§§ 126,404,502(g), 603

(last updated May 4,2016).

These sometimes crushing damage awards raise due process issues, especially in the Masterpiece
Cakeshop-type claims, where the Court has not definitively determined the legality of religious
adherents' refusal to comply with public accommodation laws on the basis of sincerely held religious

beliefs. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018).
However, that issue is beyond the scope of this paper.

191.

See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 252-53 (2002) (striking virtual child

pornography provision because government cannot restrict otherwise lawful speech to prohibit illegal

conduct); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 777 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (objecting to the use
of a speech restriction-protest-free buffer zone around entrance to abortion clinic-when actions
sought to be deterred are actionable under criminal laws). Often this principle is illustrative of an
overbroad speech restriction or a speech restriction that is not narrowly tailored to the government's
interest.
192. See NYC Comm. on Human Rights, supra note 181.
193. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
194. See Day &Weatherby, supra note 2, at 338-39; Day & Weatherby, supra note 1, at 874.
195. See Katie Pearce, Political Scientist Yascha Mounk Joins SNF Agora Institute at Johns
Hopkins, HUB (Dec. 21, 2018), https://hub.jhu.edu/2018/12/21/yascha-mounk-snf-agora-institute
(providing information on Yascha Mounk and his scholarship).
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"political correctness is a problem in our country." 9 6 Some blame
President Trump's 2016 election victory on the political
correctnessmovement.1 9 7
An in-depth discussion of any backlash to the political correctness
movement, its connection to the election of President Trump and all that
has transpired since his election must wait for a future article. However,
it is quite obvious to the average current events observer that our country
has become more divisive on issues of race, sexual orientation, gender,
and religion over the past few years.198 While the political correctness
movement may not be the cause of those changes, one only has to listen
to the words of President Trumpl 99 to realize the boomerang effect
political correctness has had on our country.200 During an August 2015
appearance on Meet the Press, President Trump stated:
We have to straighten out our country, we have to make our country
great again, and we need energy and enthusiasm .... And this political
correctness is just absolutely killing us as a country. You can't say
anything. Anything you say today, they'll find a reason why it's
notgood.201

196.

Yascha Mounk, Americans Strongly Dislike PC Culture, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 10, 2018),

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/lO/large-majorities-dislike-politicalcorrectness/572581 (noting among the general population, eighty percent believe political correctness
is a problem).
197. See, e.g., Letters: 'The Term Political Correctness Primes People to Respond Negatively',
THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.comletters/archive/2018/10/readersrespond-americans-dislike-pc-culture/572866.
198. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Trump Fansthe Flames ofa RacialFire, N.Y.TIMES (July 14,2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/14/us/politics/trump-twitter-race.html; Jeremy W. Peters, In A
Divided Era, One Thing Seems to Unite: Political Anger, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/17/us/politics/political-fights.html.
199. See, e.g., TIM ALBERTA, AMERICAN CARNAGE: ON THE FRONT LINES OF THE REPUBLICAN
CIvIL WAR AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENT TRUMP293, 296 (2019); Douglas B. McKechnie, From

Secret White House Recordings to@REALDONALDTRUMP: The Democratic Value of Presidential
Tweets, 40 CAMPBELLL. REv. 611, 633-34 (2018); Sara Swartzwelder, Taking Order From Tweets:
Redefining The FirstAmendment Boundaries of Executive Speech in the Age of Social Media, 16
FIRST AMEND. L. REv. 538, 554-56 (2018); Sonja R. West, PresidentialAttacks on the Press, 83 Mo.
L. REv. 915, 917-22 (2018); Gary O'Donoghue, Donald Trump: 'We Can't Worry About Being
Politically Correct', BBC NEWS (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world35069227/donald-trump-we-can-t-worry-about-being-politically-correct.
200. See, e.g., Ed Kilgore, 'Political Incorrectness' Is Just 'Political Correctness' for
Conservatives, N.Y. MAG. (July 17, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/07/anti-pc-ispolitical-correctness-for-the-right.html.
201. Chris Cillizza, The Dangerous Consequences of Trump's All-Out Assault on Political
Correctness, CNN (Oct. 30, 2018, 12:35 PM), https://www.cn.com/2018/10/30/politics/donaldtrump-hate-speech-anti-seniitism-steve-king-kevin-mccarthy/index.html (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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RECONSIDERING THE MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP CONFLICT

In his recent remarks on the National Day of Prayer, President Trump
took credit for winning the "war on Christmas."202 The so-called "war on
Christmas," a reference to the secularization of the holidays, was one
example used by religious conservatives to stir up fear that Christians
were under attack by liberals and Democrats during the Obama years.203
To win the support of religious conservatives and evangelical voters, thenpresidential candidate Trump seized on this fear of an alleged persecution
of Christians.204
Loyal to his base, President Trump has kept his promise to bring
religion back. 2 0 5According to the President: "[P]eople are so proud to be
using that beautiful word 'God.' And they're using that word 'God' again,
and they're not hiding from it. And they're not being told to take it down,
and they're not saying, 'We can't honor God.' In God, we trust.
So important." 206
In another broad initiative to strengthen religious liberty, the
Department of Justice, in 2017, issued a Guidance Memo to all executive
departments and agencies that instructs "to the greatest extent practicable
and permitted by law, religious observance and practice should be
reasonably accommodated in all government activity, including
employment, contracting, and programming." 20 7 The Memo enumerates
twenty Principles of Religious Liberty, setting out bold statements with
an explanatory paragraph about religious rights and what government may
and may not do. 20 8 Six of the Principles refer to the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA") 20 9 and the demanding strict scrutiny
202. Alan Noble, The Evangelical Persecution Complex, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 4, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.cominationallarchive/2014/08/the-evangelical-persecutioncomplex/375506; Eugene Scott, At a National Day ofPrayer Speech, Trump Falsely Claims There
Was Little Religious Freedom Before His Election, WASH. POST (May 2, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/05/02/national-day-prayer-speech-trump-falselyclaims-there-was-little-religious-freedom-before-his-election/?utmterm=.60ace027el98.
203. See Brakkton Booker, Fact Check: Trump's Pledge to Restore 'Merry Christmas' to the

White House, NPR (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/30/567525913/fact-check-trumps-pledge-to-restore-merry-christmas-to-the-white-house;
204. Scott, supra note 202.

Noble, supra note 202.

205.
206.

Id.
Id.

207.

Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, supra note 7, at 1.

208.
209.

Id. at 1-6.
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012); Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, supra note 7, at 1-6.

Congress passed RFRA in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Divisionv. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that strict scrutiny does not automatically apply to Free Exercise
claims seeking an exemption from compliance to neutral laws of general applicability). See Scott

Bomboy, What is the RFRA and Why Do We Care?, CONST. CTR. (June 30, 2014),
https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/what-is-rfra-and-why-do-we-care.RFRAreinstatesstrictscrutiny
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standard applicable to RFRA claims.2 1 0 One of the Principles makes clear
that "RFRA applies even when a religious adherent seeks an exemption
from a legal obligation requiring the adherent to confer benefits on third
parties." 2 1 1 Although RFRA applies only to the federal government, 2 12
many states have passed their own RFRA statutes.213
Given this President's strong support for religious freedom and two
new conservative justices on the Supreme Court, 2 14 the next Masterpiece
Cakeshop-like claim is likely to succeed on the merits of a Free Exercise
claim. Just this past term, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to decide
Klein v. Oregon Bureau of Labor & Industries,2 15 a case factually similar
to Masterpiece Cakeshop. Like Mr. Phillips, the Kleins owned a bakery
shop, exclusively making custom-made wedding cakes. 2 1 6 When the
Kleins refused to bake a cake for a same-sex wedding, they faced charges
by the Oregon Bureau of Labor and Industries for violating the state's
public accommodation law. 2 17 The Administrative Law Judge,
investigating the complaint, awarded damages of $135,000 to the lesbian
couple denied services, which was affirmed by the Oregon appellate
court. 2 1 8In their petition for certiorari, the Kleins alleged both Free Speech
and Free Exercise claims, the same claims raised, but not decided, in
Masterpiece Cakeshop.219
Fortunately, the Supreme Court "punted" once again, declining to
decide the Klein case on its merits. 2 20 In an unsigned order, the Supreme

&

standard ofjudicial review to claims that a law substantially burdens an adherent's free exercise rights,
even when the law is neutral and generally applicable. See generally Terri R. Day, Leticia Diaz
Danielle Weatherby, A Primer on Hobby Lobby: For-Profit Corporate Entities' Challenge to the
HHS Mandate, Free Exercise Rights, RFRA's Scope, and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 42 PEPP. L.

REv. 55, 69-70 (2014).
210.

Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, supra note 7 at 3-5.

211.
212.

Id. at 5.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512, 516, 536 (1997) (holding that RFRA is not

applicable to the states because Congress exceeded its authority under section five of the Fourteenth

Amendment in passing RFRA).
213. See generally Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, LGBT Rights and the Mini-RFRA: A
Return to Separate but Equal, 65 DEPAUL L. REv.907 (2016) (discussing state RFRA laws).
214. See Current Members, SUP. CT. U. S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.a
spx (last visited Nov. 18, 2019) (Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh).

215. 410 P.3d 1051 (Or. App. 2017) (petition for certiorari filed Oct. 19, 2018, distributed
petition for conference, April 26, 2019) (seeking review on Free Speech and Free Exercise claims of
bakery owners fined under Oregon's public accommodation law for refusal to make a custom-made
wedding cake for a same-sex ceremony).

216. Id. at 1057.
217. Id. at 1057-59.
218. Id. at 1060.
219. Id. at 1056-57; see Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct.
1719, 1723-24 (2018).
220. Klein v. Or. Bureau of Labor& Indus., 139 S. Ct. 2713 (2019).
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Court vacated the decision of the Oregon appellate court and remanded
the case for "further considerations in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop."221
Also, in Arlene's Flowers, Inc. v. Washington,2 2 2 a case involving a
florist who refused to create floral arrangements for a same-sex marriage
ceremony, the Supreme Court vacated the decision below for "further
consideration in light of Masterpiece Cakeshop."2 2 3 On remand to the
Washington Supreme Court, the Court affirmed the initial decision
reached by its lower court. 2 2 4 The florist has subsequently stated her
intention to bring the case before the Supreme Court once again. 2 25
A constitutional decision in favor of the Kleins or Arlene's Flowers
could have opened a Pandora's Box. As Justice Scalia wisely observed,
some legal controversies are better left to the "people rather than to the
courts [in] that the people, unlike judges, need not carry things to their
logical conclusion." 2 2 6If the Supreme Court were to hold that a religious
adherent has a constitutional right under the Free Exercise Clause to be
exempt from compliance with a public accommodation law, that decision
could create a steep slippery slope threatening unlimited opportunities for
LGBTQ discrimination with the imprimatur of the Constitution.
Typically, defenders of individual rights and equal protection look to
the Supreme Court to enshrine those rights with constitutional
protection. 2 27 In Obergefell v. Hodges, Justice Kennedy said: "The
dynamic of our constitutional system is that individuals need not await
right." 2 2 8
a fundamental
asserting
before
action
legislative
Notwithstanding the strong dissents to the contrary, Justice Kennedy
ensured that same-sex couples had the right to marry in every state
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution.2 2 9

221. Id.
222. 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018).
223. Id. at 2671; Washington v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 548-49 (Wash. 2017).
224. Washington v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., 441 P.3d 1203,1237-38 (Wash. 2019) (holding that
the flower shop owner discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation by refusing to provide custom
floral arrangements for same-sex wedding and the Washington Law Against Discrimination did not
violate First Amendment protections against compelled speech).
225. Jacqueline Thomsen, Supreme Court Sends Same-Sex Wedding Cake Case Back Down to
Lower Court, THE HILL (June 17, 2019, 9:38 AM), https://thehill.com/regulation/courtbattles/448868-supreme-court-sends-same-sex-wedding-cake-case-back-down-to-lower.
226. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J. dissenting).
227. See, e.g., Arlene's Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 2017 WL 3126218 (2017),petitionforwrit
of cert.filed, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018) (No. 17-108).
228. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015).
229. Id. at 2605-04.
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Justice Kennedy also wrote the majority opinion in Masterpiece
Cakeshop. Referring back to his words in Obergefell, he wrote:
The First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons
are given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are
so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths. Nevertheless, while
those religious and philosophical objections are protected, it is a
general rule that such objections do not allow business owners and
other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons
equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally
applicablepublic accommodations law. 230
Times have changed and the Court has changed. While the
Constitution is usually considered a shield protecting individual liberties,
the present Court has the potential to interpret the Constitution in such a
way that Free Exercise becomes a sword justifying discrimination. With
Justice Kennedy's retirement and the appointment of Justices Gorsuch
and Kavanaugh, a state law remedy to the Masterpiece Cakeshop and
Klein-like cases, pitting anti-discrimination against Free Exercise, may
be preferable.
While somewhat counter-intuitive, a very specific, narrowly written
religious exemption in those public accommodation laws that prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation would be a compromise
to the Masterpiece Cakeshop conflict. In this post-Obergefell, antipolitical correctness era, a call for compromise rests on the acceptance of
two basic assumptions: (1) Obergefell left a door open for religious
adherents to continue in belief and perhaps actions considered expressive
conduct to oppose same-sex marriage 23 1 and (2) compelling small
business owners with sincerely held religious beliefs to provide services
for same-sex marriages is, in essence, compelling the politically correct
view of marriage.
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court noted that, while the Colorado
Civil Rights Commission was adjudicating the CADA claim against Mr.
Phillips, it ruled in favor of other bakers, who refused to bake cakes with
messages that demeaned gay marriage. 2 3 2 Owners of Sweet Cakes by
Melissa, the Kleins, who were ordered to pay $135,000 to the lesbian
couple for whom they refused to custom-make a wedding cake, also
refused to custom-make a cake celebrating a divorce. 2 33 Certainly,a
230. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
231. See Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. at2607.
232. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1728.
233.

S.

Ct 1719, 1727 (2018)

Ken Klukowski, Oregon EncouragesIntolerance by Punishing Aaron and Melissa Klein,

WASH. ExAMINER (March 13, 2018, 1:01 AM), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/oregon-
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baker's refusal to put a particular message on a cake is different than a
general ban on making custom-made baked goods for same-sex
marriages. But, is enforcement of public accommodation laws against
those who hold religious beliefs condemning same-sex marriage, in effect,
punishing a disfavored belief about marriage?
Calling on the legislative jurisdictions that have extended LGBTQ
anti-discrimination protections in public accommodations, to now create
a very limited religious exemption is, in this Author's view, a necessary
and practical compromise. As a model for the workability of this
approach, legislators and courts could look to the religious exemption
provided in the Selective Service Act for conscientious objectors with
sincerely held religious beliefs.234 Conscription exemptions were a matter
of statutory interpretation and not constitutionally based. Such an
approach to the Masterpiece Cakeshop conflict might provide a path for
accommodating sincerely held religious beliefs without creating a
constitutionally-enshrined right to discriminate under a broad
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. A statutory exemption can be
construed narrowly with limited application; 23 5 a judicially-recognized
encourages-intolerance-by-punishing-aaron-and-melissa-klein.
234. The Selective Service Act identifies a group known as "Conscientious Objectors," which
gives members of the group, if drafted, an "opportunity to file a claim for exemption from military
service based upon their religious or moral objection to war." See Who Must Register, SELECTIVE
SERv. SYS., https://www.sss.gov/Registration-InfolWho-Registration (last visited Nov. 18,2019); see
also Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361, 383, 385 (1974) (noting that when "inclusion of one group
promotes a legitimate governmental purpose, and the addition of other groups would not, we cannot
say that the statute's classification of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is invidiously
discriminatory," and holding that the exclusion of conscientious objectors from veterans' educational
benefits was rational, in part, because the benefits would not incentivize service for that class); United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 175-76 (1965) (deciding that by using the words "Supreme Being"
rather than "God," Congress intended to broaden the scope of religions included, and further ruling
"[t]he test might be stated in these words: A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life
of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the
exemption comes within the statutory definition."); Lawrence G. Sager, In The Name of God:
StructuralInjustice and Religious Faith, 60 ST. Louis U. L. J. 585, 588 (2016); Nadia N. Sawicki,
The Hollow Promise of Freedom of Conscience, 33 CARDOZO L. REv. 1389, 1389 (2012) (arguing
that "in order for American law to reflect the kind of robust, autonomy-based respect for conscience
to which every pluralistic society aspires, we must agree on a content-neutral guiding principle for
negotiating future claims for legal accommodation."); Mark Strasser, On Same-Sex Marriage and
Matters of Conscience, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 2-3 (2010).
235. See, e.g., John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp.,493 U.S. 146,151-52 (1989) (applying this
principle in the Freedom of Information Act context); see also FLA. STAT. § 761.061 (2017)
(prohibiting government action against religious organizations based on the denial of services to
same-sex couples); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-62-5(5) (2017) (Mississippi law prohibiting state
government from taking any discriminatory action for the denial of services based on "sincerely held
religious belief or moral conviction" for providers of "photography, poetry, videography, disc-jockey
services, wedding planning, printing, publishing or similar marriage-related goods or services" and
of "[flloral arrangements, dress making, cake or pastry artistry, assembly-hall or other wedding-venue
rentals, limousine or other car-service rentals, jewelry sales and services, or similar marriage-related
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constitutional right may expand to its "logical conclusion," demonstrating
Justice Scalia's point that some things are best left to the
legislative process.236
In 2015, shortly after the Obergefell decision, the State of Indiana
passed SB 101, a state Religious Freedom Restoration Act.32 7 Despite
opposition from the LGBTQ and business communities, then-Governor
Mike Pence signed the bill into law, with resounding support from
religious leaders and the conservative right. 23 8 Indiana's RFRA had
language that opponents feared would permit for-profit businesses to
discriminate in public accommodations and other services and use
religious freedom as a defense to any private action brought against a
business for violation of public accommodation laws or antidiscrimination laws.239 There was a swift national outcry and huge
economic losses to the state from cancellations of planned events and
business expansions. Within a week, Indiana amended its RFRA adding
sexual orientation and gender identity to the list of factors that could not
be cause for denial of service.2 The Indiana experience makes Justice
Scalia's point that some legal controversies are better left to the people.42 1
Mr. Phillips and others have argued that their creatively-made cakes
and wedding-related goods and services are expression protected under
the First Amendment Free Speech Clause.242 In Masterpiece Cakeshop,
the Court did not decide this issue. 2 4 3 But, in oral arguments, many
members of the Court expressed doubt about finding a logical standard
for deciding where to draw the line between what is and is not artistic
expression.24 A few justices peppered Mr. Phillips's counsel with
questions about line-drawing between wedding-related service providers,
whose work is artistic expression: the hairdresser; the makeup-artist, the
chef, the flower arranger, the baker, the tailor? 245 No satisfactory answers
were forthcoming. A compelled speech argument based on characterizing
services, accommodations, facilities or goods").
236. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
237. Dwight Adams, RFRA: Why the 'Religious Freedom' Law Signed by Mike Pence Was So
Controversial,INDYSTAR (May 3, 2018, 3:23 PM), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2018/
04/25/rfra-indiana-why-law-signed-mike-pence-so-controversial/546411002.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
242. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1726-27
(2018); Maxine Bernstein, Owners of 'Sweet Cakes' File Appeal, THE COLUMBIAN (Mar. 12, 2018,
9:06 PM), https://www.columbian.com/news/2018/mar/02/owners-of-sweet-cakes-file-appeal.
243. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1723-24, 1731-32.
244. Oral Argument at 09:04, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138
S. Ct. 1719 (2018) (No. 16-111), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-111.
245. Id. at 08:55.
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a custom-made cake as expressive art protected under the Free Speech
Clause seems dubious, with no workable standard to apply.
But, compelled speech may be the right doctrine to apply, just in a
different way. If religious objectors' sincerely held religious beliefs
concern a particular view about marriage, and not a pretext to
discriminate, then, to force the government's view of marriage contradicts
the central meaning of the First Amendment. Religious views on marriage
should have their way in the marketplace of ideas 246 and "no
official

..

. can

prescribe

what

shall

be

orthodox

in ...

matters

of opinion ... . "247
Discrimination in places of public accommodation robs "the rights
and dignity of gay persons who are, or wish to be, married" 248 but are
denied the same goods and services as others. It is a microassault. But, if
the refusal of bakers like Mr. Phillips is based on a sincerely held belief
that they will be complicit in furthering what their religion tells them is
wrong, is punishing non-compliance, with potentially hefty fines, a way
to deter discrimination or an act of intolerance for a socially unacceptable
view of marriage?
This Author has consistently condemned LGBTQ discrimination;
and this proposal, to amend public accommodation laws to provide a
narrowly defined religious exemption, may seem contrary to previously
held positions. 24 9 However, it is a practical "lesser of two evils"
compromise given the political and judicial climate of today.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Public accommodation laws have become the next battlefield for
religious conservatives, who lost the fight against same-sex marriage.
Obergefell left the door open for businesses like Masterpiece Cakeshop to
seek conscience protection against charges of discrimination in public
accommodations when refusing to use their services in furtherance of a
same-sex wedding. In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy provided a caveat that
the constitutional right to same-sex marriage did not remove First
Amendment protections from religious persons to continue to advocate
that same-sex marriage should not be condoned. 2 50 In dissent, Justice Alito
warned that post-Obergefell, religious believers who expressed their
246. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
247. W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943).
248. MasterpieceCakeshop, Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 1723.
249. See generally Day & Weatherby, supra note 213; Terri R. Day & Danielle Weatherby, The
Case for LGBT Equality: Reviving the Political Process Doctrine and Repurposing the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1015 (2016).
250. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015).
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opposition to same-sex marriage would be labeled bigots; his prediction
proved true for the owner of Masterpiece Cakeshop. 251
This Article re-thinks an absolute position against religious
exemptions in light of the current political and judicial climate. President
Trump has pushed policies that would expand free exercise rights way
beyond the facts of Masterpiece Cakeshop. With the re-configured Court
and President Trump's expanded religious protections, a legislative
compromise is the "lesser of two evils" rather than a court decision giving
constitutional "permission" to discriminate under an expansion of Free
Exercise. Such a decision could create a steep slippery slope with
no brakes!
This Article proposes the perspective that those with sincerely held
religious beliefs, who oppose using their services in furtherance of samesex marriages, are expressing a religious view about marriage. 2 52 This
view has become socially unacceptable in the jurisdictions that protect
against discrimination based on sexual orientation in places of
public accommodations.
After considering the political correctness movement and its
microaggression-focused consequences, this Article suggests that
enforcing a socially accepted view of marriage through public
accommodation laws is, in essence, compelling political correctness.253
The past few years have demonstrated that compelled political correctness
has a boomerang effect and can increase LGBTQ discrimination.
While religious views against same-sex marriage are offensive to
those whose right to marriage is protected, to punish such views is
contrary to the central meaning of the First Amendment. Like
microaggressions, those public accommodation businesses that refuse
their services in furtherance of same-sex marriages affront the dignity of
members of the LGBTQ community. But, the First Amendment requires
that we tolerate the intolerable when it comes to matters of faith
and opinion.

251. Id. at 2642-43 (Alito, J., dissenting); see Jason Salzman, Spinning a Bigot into a 'Cake
Artist', COLO. POL. (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.coloradopolitics.com/opinion/spinning-a-bigot-intoa-cake-artist/articledd3904a8-7382-54b2-9dc4-ccdf3ca423d6.html.
252.
253.

See supra Part VII.
See supra Part VII.
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